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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of hypothetical market reforms in North.  We build a 
dynamic general equilibrium model and simulate multiple reform scenarios.   
We first construct a baseline model which mimicks the current command economy.   In this 
scenario the government allocates output in an inefficient way and simulated economic growth is 
negative.  We next model a semi-market transition that allows producers choices regarding the 
distribution of available capital.  However, total capital is still chosen by the government.  Lastly, 
we consider two scenarios with full market reform allowing for the usual market mechanisms 
derived from consumer utility maximization, firm profit maximization, and market clearing 
prices.  In one scenario we keep government investment in public infrastructure unchanged at the 
low baseline level.  In the other we drastically increase the rate of infrastructure investment so 
that it matches that of South Korea.  In all we maintain a closed economy assumption and a 
constant size for the military. 
Our simulations show little hope for the North Korean economy without a significant 
increase in infrastructure.  Although all of the reforms raise the level of output and consumption 
per capita, only with significant increases in infrastructure investment does output growth change 
from negative to positive. 
1 
1.  Introduction 
Korea was annexed by Japan in 1919 and partitioned into two parts at the end of World War 
II.  At the Yalta Conference in February of 1945 the Allied Powers agreed to a division of the 
Korean peninsula into two spheres of influence.  The Soviet Union would administer the area 
north of the 38th parallel and the United States administered the south.  In June of 1950 war 
broke out on the peninsula.  When the armistice agreement was signed in July of 1953, Korea 
was effectively divided into the two halves along a border very close to the original 38th parallel.  
There have been two Koreas with two very different economic systems ever since. 
Prior to South Korea’s rapid growth beginning in the 1960’s, North Korea enjoyed the higher 
standard of living.  With the Soviet Union as the primary source of trade and outside resources, 
the North maintained a relatively stable economy for decades.  Obviously, today much has 
changed.  With the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990’s, and after a series of floods and famines, 
North Korea experienced a massive drop in standards of living.  Many North Koreans illegally 
cross the border into China in search of food, freedom and opportunity.  Meanwhile, the 
international community has imposed increasingly tighter economic sanctions on North Korea, 
most recently due to its pursuit of nuclear weapons technology.  Even before these sanctions, 
however, the country’s juche ideology with its emphasis on self-reliance meant that North 
Korean traded little with the rest of the world.  Today, what little trade does occur comes 
primarily through China or comes in the form of foreign humanitarian aid.1  North Korea has a 
highly planned economy set up along Stalinist lines.  While there is some evidence of emerging 
                                                 
1 One notable exception is the cooperative economic zone in Gaeseong, just across the demilitarized zone from 
the South.  Virtually all the investment and trade here is through South Korean firms. 
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market activity, the fact remains that North Korea has one of the most rigidly state-controlled 
economies in the world. 
What is the prognosis for the North Korean economy?  In some ways this is a trivial question.  
Without economic reform of some sort the country will remain stagnant and backward, perhaps 
even falling further into poverty.  In other ways, however, this is a very difficult question.  No 
one outside of North Korea (and very few inside) fully understands current economic conditions.  
The secretive nature of the regime makes in almost impossible for outsiders to guess at likely 
future changes in economic policy.  Still, there are some things we do know, or can deduce.  For 
example, the economy is terribly short of capital goods.  What little capital remains from earlier 
decades is sadly out-of-date, and much of it is no longer functional.  We also know that, outside 
of the capital of Pyeongyang, the country is lacking all but the most rudimentary infrastructure.  
The telecommunications system is primitive at best, port facilities are minimal, and even major 
roads are narrow and often in poor repair.  The government allocates much of the economy’s 
output to the military spending2, seemingly regardless of civilian hardship.  Per capita GDP for 
the year 2004, according to Bank of Korea estimates, is less than $1000. 
This paper builds a model of the North Korean economy, and attempts to shed light on its 
likely future, as well as the effects of possible reforms.  We note that almost any real reform will 
improve the North Korean economy.  The more difficult task is to estimate the size of the impact 
on the economy. 
We are not the first to attempt forecasts for the North Korean economy.  Eberstadt (1990) 
predicted an utter collapse of the economic system, for example.  Since then, there has been a  
sharp decline in the economy, but it has avoided a total collapse so far.  Noland (2000), in 
                                                 
2 Estimates range from one-third to one-fifth of GDP. 
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examining recent changes in the North Korean economy, concluded that it does not have the 
ability to produce the investment needed to escape poverty.  He noted that North Korea’s 
economy allocates some limited final goods through price mechanisms, and predicted this trend 
would continue.  North Korea introduced limited market reforma in July of 2002, but the extent 
of the reform and its consequences seem to be minimal – extreme energy shortages, and other 
economic factors, may have increased state control, rather than decrease them as intended 
(Seliger 2005).   
Bradford and Phillips (2005) in their analysis of the reunification of South and North Korea, 
include various reforms of the North Korean economy.  However, those simulations start with 
the baseline assumption of an established market system. 
The North Korean economy is an inefficient centrally-planned economy with almost no 
international trade. The government dictates employment, production, investment, and 
consumption in the economy.  Therefore, we construct a baseline model that resembles an 
extreme centrally planned economy with complete autarky.  We borrow heavily from Bradford 
and Phillips (2005) in setting up the basic production structure of our model including the 
characterization of final goods, intermediate goods, technology, infrastructure and the defense 
burden.  However, in our baseline case we do not allow for optimal decision-making on the part 
of households and firms.  Instead, all key decisions are made by the government. 
 
2. Building a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model 
We assume there is a single final good which can be used for consumption or investment in 
physical capital, infrastructure or defense capital.  This good is produced by aggregating 
intermediate goods.  We calibrate using eight intermediate sectors.  These intermediate goods are 
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produced using three factors: capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor.  The decision-makers in 
the economy can allocate capital and unskilled labor across the intermediate goods in any way 
they wish, through command or market mechanisms.  Skilled labor, however, is assumed to be 
useable only in a specific industry.  Hence there are eight different kinds of skilled labor.  Skilled 
workers must work in the sector where their skill is used, they cannot produce other intermediate 
goods.  Unskilled workers, on the other hand, can work producing any of the intermediate goods.  
Both types of labor have permanently fixed supplies3. 
We assume that productivity in North Korea is influenced by two factors.  The first is 
international productivity.  As better technologies emerge in the rest of the world, North Korea 
gradually adopts them.  A second factor, that limits technology, is domestic infrastructure.  We 
assume that more infrastructure per worker leads to higher productivity.  This implicitly assumes 
congestion effects; that is, if there are more workers we must have correspondingly more 
infrastructure to maintain the same level of productivity.  With fixed labor supplies, these 
congestion effects do not materialize as congestion, per se, but the amount of infrastructure does 
impose limits on productivity. 
The basic structure of this baseline model will not change when we introduce reforms later in 
the paper.  However, reforms will alter how capital and labor are allocated across the 
intermediate sectors and how the final goods are allocated over consumption and investment in 
the three kinds of capital. 
We now proceed with a formal mathematical derivation of the baseline model.   
 
                                                 
3 The labor force in North Korea, excluding the military, does not appear to be growing.  The declining 
population of youth, due to low birth-rates and recent famines, indicates at best a stagnant labor growth. 
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Intermediate Goods 
Intermediate goods are produced using the three factors of production: capital, unskilled 
labor, and skilled labor.  The output of each intermediate good is defined by the following 
constant returns-to-scale production function: 
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where iY  is output of intermediate good i, iK is the capital stock used to produced good i, 
iN and iL  are the quantities of unskilled and skilled labor, and Z is the economy-wide level of 
labor-augmenting technology.   
 
Final Goods 
Aggregate output is a single final good that is also produced with constant returns-to-scale 
technology and uses intermediate goods only.  We use an Armington aggregator: 
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where the ia ’s are industry shares in GDP.   
 
Capital and Investment 
Captial for each sector grows according to the following law of motion: 
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where K  is the aggregate capital stock,   is the depreciation rate,   is the percentage of 
final output the government invests in physical capital, and i .is the percentage of this new 
capital that is allocated to industry i.  Here and throughout the paper, a ′ denotes the value of a 
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variable the following period and a ∆ indicates a change in a capital stock; i.e. investment.  We 
assume the central planner invests in each sector proportionally to the size of the sector’s capital 
stock.  If a sector has 25% of the total capital stock, the government decides to allocate 25% of 
the new (invested) capital to that sector.   
 
Infrastructure 
The government allocates a portion of its final goods (Y) to build up the domestic 
infrastructure to desired levels.  Over time, infrastructure evolves according to the following law 
of motion: 
YIIII   ;)1('   (3) 
where I denotes the infrastructure level, and   is the percent of GDP the government invests 
in infrastructure each period. 
 
Defense 
The government allocates a proportion of final output to the creation of new military capital, 
which evolves over time according the following law of motion: 
YMMMM   ;)1('   (4) 
where M denotes military capital and μ is the percent of GDP invested in military capital. 
The government also conscripts soldiers from the ranks of unskilled labor.  It combines these 
soldiers with the military capital to produce a level of national defense as shown below: 
dd ZfNMD  1)(   (5) 
where f is the percentage of the unskilled labor force conscripted into the military. 
 
7 
Technology 
The economy-wide level of technology changes over time as a function of world technology 
and domestic infrastructure per unskilled worker according to: 
hh NIzZ  1)/(   (6) 
where z denotes world technology levels. 
External technology grows at a constant rate zg each period: 
zgz z )1(
'    (7) 
Combining equations (6) and (7) gives a law of motion for Z that depends on last period’s 
technology level and the growth rate of infrastructure stock: 
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Aggregation 
The aggregation and market-clearing conditions are: 
capital stock aggregation, 

j
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unskilled labor aggregation, 
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j
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skilled labor aggregation, 
jLL jj    (11) 
and final goods aggregation 
IMKCKY    (12) 
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Utility 
In the baseline model, have no control over their consumption levels.  However, they still 
derive utility from the consumption the government gives them.  In our final two scenarios we 
allow consumers to choose savings levels and consumption, so we present that problem here for 
the sake of parsimony.  We imagine an infinitely-lived agent in line with standard 
macroeconomic models.  It is convenient to express the household’s problem in the form of a 
dynamic programming problem: 
)}','({Max),( 11 1' 
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Where Θ is the information set available to the household, σ is the elasticity of substitution, C 
is household consumption, β is the subjective discount rate, the wi are skilled wages, v is the 
unskilled wage, r is the return on capital and T is net government lump-sum taxation. 
If we solve the problem from equation (13) we get the following Euler equation which 
describes the behavior of consumption over time and can be used to find the path of the 
aggregate capital stock. 
)}'1('{     rCEC   (14) 
 
3. Baseline Simulation 
Accurately parameterizing a model for the North Korean economy is frustrating due to the 
lack of reliable data.  The North Korean government does not publish its economic indicators 
regularly and the data are often unreliable when they do.  We use data and analysis from the 
Bank of Korea, the United Nations, and the South Korean Unification Ministry. 
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We choose the parameters for households and production as follows.  The subjective 
discount factor, β, is set to .95, consistent with an annual discount rate of 5%.  The elasticity of 
substitution, σ, is set to .087 which gives a steady state user cost of capital of 3% APR in our 
simulations.  The depreciation rate, ŏ, is set to 10% per year.  We set the annual growth reat of 
world technology, gz, to 1.5%.  The share of world technology in domestic technology, h, is set 
rather arbitrarily to one-half.  Using data from the GTAP dataset for Korea we find the average 
share of capital in GDP, b, is .431 and the share of unskilled labor, c, is .394.  We use these 
values for North Korea. 
Government policy variables for North Korea are set to match observed data.  The 
conscription rate, f, is 15% and generates a standing army of approximately one million.  The 
physical capital investment rate, φ, of 14% comes from United Nations estimates.  The 
infrastructure investment rate, ψ, is 0.8% and comes from ??????.  A military investment rate, μ, 
of 25% generates a level of defense roughly the same size as that in South Korea. 
The fixed labor supplies are carefully constructed from data across sectors reported by the 
Bank of Korea, the GTAP dataset and North Korean reports to the United Nations4 in 1993 and 
1998.  Normalizing so that the number of skilled workers in the South is 100, we get skilled and 
unskilled labor force values in North Korea of approximately 27 and 186 respectively. 
                                                 
4 The labor division numbers rely on the DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics, Tabulation of the Population 
Census of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the ROK National Statistical office.  We also use the 
division of skilled and unskilled labor numbers given by: DPRK, Core Document Forming Part of The Reports of 
State Parties, United Nations Human Rights Instruments, 24 Jun 2002.  The document, “기술자 및 전문가 수” 
(kisulja mit chŏnmun’ga su, roughly translated, “number of skilled and expert laborers”), gives a 4.5:1 ratio of 
unskilled to skilled workers.  The dynamics of labor growth seem to be stagnant or slightly decreasing.  We assume 
no labor growth due to this estimation. 
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The distribution of the skilled labor force across intermediate industries is also constructed 
from the 1993 North Korean census report. 
Finally, the shares of each intermediate industry in GDP, the α’s, are obtained by using data 
on sectoral output from the sources mentioned above and from the South Korean Ministry of 
Unification. 
To simulate, we also need to choose starting values for the capital stocks across sectors, the 
level of infrastructure, and the level of unskilled workers allocated to each sector.  We use data 
from 2004 to calibrate our starting values.  We get the unskilled labor data and we also obtain 
output data for the same sectors.  With this in hand and given the parameter values above we can 
solve for initial capital stocks using equation (1).  Infrastructure measures come from the 
Ministry of Unification5. 
The values of our parameters and initial values are all reported in table 1. 
With these initial shares and the described laws of motion, we simulate the North Korean 
economy under its current central planning policies.  We assume that external technology 
evolves smoothly over time and that there are no policy shocks to disturb the smooth transition 
of the economy to its long-run steady state. 
Figures 1 - 3 show a dramatic decrease in the capital stock and production in the aggregate 
and across all sectors.  The government does not invest enough in capital and infrastructure to 
maintain positive growth rates.  This is true despite its allocating 14% of output to new capital 
investment.  Our results are contrary to forecasts by the Bank of Korea, which predicts a solid 3-
4% annual growth in output for North Korea. 
                                                 
5 For the initial infrastructure in the North we use IN = IS Ω; IS=100, where Ω is the ratio of three measures of 
infrastructure indicators between South and North Korea: harbor capacity, energy generation capacity, and shipping 
tonnage.    is 8.08, meaning North Korea is estimated to have about 12% infrastructure of South Korea. 
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4. Semi-Market Reform 
There are many possible ways to implement limited market reforms in North Korea.  We 
focus on the adoption of market mechanisms along the lines of the Chinese reforms of the 1980’s.  
These are likely to be implemented gradually.  Indeed, North Korea has already begun to slowly 
free up some prices, such as those for food and some other consumer goods.  This may be in an 
attempt to stimulate production in the small, but increasingly important, private sector.  Or it may 
be a reluctant recognition that these markets already exist outside state control and have become 
essential to avoid total collapse of the economy. 
Allowing the market to set the price of final goods will reduce waste and inefficiency in the 
distribution of these goods.  However, it will not have any effect on the production of goods 
unless the producers are also free to respond to price movements.  We allow this via a 
modification to capital investment policy.  In our reformed economy we imagine that firms are 
free to trade capital in a capital market.  In this case capital allocation will be determined by the 
marginal product of capital which will be the same in all sectors.  We continue to assume, 
however, that central planners still determine the size of the aggregate capital stock through 
control of the percentage of output that is allocated to investment.  In other words, the 
government controls the size of the capital stock, but allows firms to compete with each other for 
the right to use this capital. 
We simulate this change in policy by modifying our original simulation.  We keep the 
baseline simulation for periods 1-9, but implement our reform time period 10.   
We expect the overall capital stock to roughly follow the baseline path since the government 
does not change the percentage of output allocated to the capital stock and infrastructure.  
12 
However, we also expect one-time efficiency gains that will raise the level of output due to more 
efficient allocation of capital. 
Reform shifts the capital allocation across sectors radically as shown in table 2.  There is a 
dramatic decrease in sector 7, which is government-related services, and a large increase in 
sector 5, manufactured goods.  This implies that under the baseline regime the governmental 
service sector has too much capital invested (relative to its labor resources) while the 
manufacturing sector has too little.  The shifting of resources results in a small efficiency gain 
for overall output which can be seen in Figure 4.   
Because the reform is fully implemented in one time period (at t=10), we notice a small rise 
in aggregate output in that period.  While there are short term benefits to this type of reform, the 
effect in the long-run is close to nil.  The economy still follows a slowly deteriorating path. 
 
5. Full Market Reform 
More meaningful market reforms would allow for endogenously chosen capital investment, 
made by savers in the economy rather than by central planners. Unskilled labor movement across 
sectors would also be allowed and would eliminate differences in unskilled wages across sectors.  
Even with the adoption of a full market economy, however, the government would most likely 
maintain control over infrastructure and military investment. 
We allow for market reform by adopting more common assumptions about the role that 
consumers and firms play in the economy.  We introduce the following features to the model that 
do not exist in the baseline or semi-market simulations: 
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First, we allow consumer choice in consumption and savings.  This drives endogenously 
chosen investment in capital.  The household’s problem for this case was introduced in section 2 
and is described by equations (13) and (14) 
Second, we allow firms to compete competitively for both labor and capital with unskilled 
labor to moving freely across all sectors and equalizing the unskilled wage rates. 
Third, we allow the government to impose lump-sum taxes on household which it uses to 
fund the purchase of infrastructure and military capital. 
We consider two parameterizations in this section.  In the “Market 1” case, the government 
maintains an infrastructure investment rate of 0.8%, consistent with the level of previous 
baseline and semi-market scenarios.  In the “Market 2” case, the infrastructure investment rate 
increases to 2.5%, the same as the rate for South Korea.  Increased infrastructure investment 
lowers consumption in the short term, as the government must tax the consumers in order to 
build new infrastructure6.  However, in the long-run it raises the economy’s level of technology.  
We do not model the infrastructure decision as an optimal choice on the part of the government; 
we simply examine the results from two different values. 
Figures 5 – 9 show the effects of both market reforms 1 and 2. They graph four scenarios for 
comparison purposes. These correspond to simulations where: 1) there is no reform, 2) there is 
semi-market reform in period 10, but not subsequent reforms, 3) semi-market reform is followed 
by full market reform in period 20, and 4) full market reform is followed by an increase in 
infrastructure investment in period 30. 
                                                 
6  To clarify, capital investment rate in the market reform scenarios are “chosen” by utility maximizing 
consumers and profit maximizing firms through market mechanisms.  Thus capital investment is optimally chosen 
over time.  Infrastructure investment rate, meanwhile, is a government policy choice.  No optimality conditions are 
considered by the government. 
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The figures show that full market reform still lacks the infrastructure growth necessary to 
facilitate a growing economy.  When the investment rate for infrastructure is increased to 2.5% 
in the final scenario, the economy turns around and begins to follow a transition path to a steady 
state with positive growth.  Effective reform in North Korea will require more than just adoption 
of market mechanisms.  With an already depleted infrastructure stock, the government must 
commit to a policy of infrastructure growth. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The downward spiral of the North Korean economy will not be easy to remedy. Our baseline, 
which models the status quo for the North Korean economy, predicts a very grim future.  If 
current economic policies are maintained, slowly deteriorating living standards and even 
starvation could result.  The semi-reform simulation shows that while incomplete reform may be 
tempting, it is not as beneficial as planners may hope.  Full market reform, with efficient capital 
investment and allocation may restore real growth to the North Korean economy, but only if 
coupled with increases in infrastructure. 
None of our scenarios include any openness to trade.  Growth patterns observed in the market 
reforms would most likely be enhanced by foreign aid, trade in goods, and international 
borrowing and lending. 
In our modeling exercises, we do not take into account the political difficulty of such 
economic reforms.  However, the reforms proposed in this paper do not require opening for 
foreign trade, although trade would more than likely bring much gain; North Korea can remain a 
“hermit kingdom” and still adopt a more efficient internal economic system if it so chooses.  
Moreover, foreign aid and the lifting of sanctions are much more likely if the regime 
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demonstrates a serious commitment to economic reforms.  On the other hand, market reforms by 
their very nature involve a loss of control by those who administer the central government.  So 
little is known about how political decisions are made in North Korea, that is it impossible to 
predict how attractive or unattractive this loss of control would be. 
Can the North Korean economy be salvaged?  Without serious reform, the economy appears 
to lack the ability and the infrastructure to resurrect itself.  Even with reforms, the momentum of 
the current decline will prove to be difficult to overcome for a number of years.  However, any 
major reform can be a significant marker in North Korea’s road to recovery after long years of 
suffering. 
It is worth remembering that South Korea’s relative wealth and economic prosperity was not 
achieved overnight.  It was decades after the Korean war before South Korea began to 
experience high rates of economic growth.  As the saying goes, “A journey of a thousand miles 
must begin with the first step.”  Though the road seems very far for the North Korean economy, 
the first steps need to be taken. 
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Table 1 
 
Economy-wide Parameters 
b capital share 0.441 
c unskilled labor share 0.394 
h foreign technology share 0.5 
gz foreign technology growth 0.015 
β subjective discount factor 0.95 
δ depreciation rate 0.1 
σ elasticity of substitution 0.087 
f conscription rate 0.15 
μ military investment rate .25 
ψ infrastructure investment rate .08 
φ capital investment rate .14 
N size of unskilled labor force 185.76 
 
Industry-level Parameters 
  Description 
iL  i  
Sector 1 Non-Traded Foods 1.31 0.2090 
Sector 2 Natural Resources 0.87 0.0730 
Sector 3 Traded foods 6.94 0.1050 
Sector 4 Processing 2.26 0.0610 
Sector 5 Manufacturing 9.02 0.1220 
Sector 6 Utilities 0.04 0.0450 
Sector 7 Non-trades Services 4.14 0.2890 
Sector 8 Traded Services 2.46 0.0960 
 
Simulation Starting Values 
I = 0.12, M = 3.0 
  Description 
iN  iK  
Sector 1 Non-Traded Foods 8.99 0.37 
Sector 2 Natural Resources 6.00 0.04 
Sector 3 Traded foods 47.68 0.13 
Sector 4 Processing 15.50 0.04 
Sector 5 Manufacturing 61.98 0.04 
Sector 6 Utilities 0.26 0.10 
Sector 7 Non-trades Services 28.43 0.83 
Sector 8 Traded Services 16.92 0.11 
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Table 2 
Capital and Output Changes in Semi-Market Reform 
Sectors 
9K  10K  iK  % K  9Y  10Y  iY  % Y  
1 0.225 0.185 -0.040 -18.0% 0.498 0.447 -0.051 -10.3% 
2 0.022 0.064 0.042 189.3% 0.174 0.272 0.098 56.5% 
3 0.080 0.092 0.012 15.4% 0.249 0.260 0.011 4.3% 
4 0.026 0.074 0.048 180.3% 0.145 0.224 0.079 54.3% 
5 0.022 0.241 0.219 998.2% 0.290 0.819 0.528 182.0% 
6 0.064 0.055 -0.008 -13.1% 0.107 0.099 -0.009 -7.9% 
7 0.508 0.160 -0.348 -68.5% 0.688 0.405 -0.283 -41.2% 
8 0.066 0.090 0.024 36.4% 0.228 0.257 0.028 12.3% 
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Figure 1 
Baseline sector capital stocks 
(Ratios relative to K at time period 0) 
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Figure 2 
Baseline Sector Outputs 
(Ratios relative to sum of Yi’s at time period 0)  
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Figure 3 
Baseline Dynamics of Key Economic Variables 
(Ratios relative to values at time period 0) 
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Figure 4 
Key Economic Indicators in Semi-Market Reform 
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Figure 5 
Aggregate Capital (K) Summary 
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Figure 6 
Infrastructure (I) Summary 
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Figure 7 
Technology growth (Z) Summary 
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Figure 8 
Aggregate Output (Y) Summary 
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Figure 9 
Consumption (C) Summary 
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